

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ADVANCED WHIST

BY

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"Easy Whist," "The Hands at Whist," "Games at Cards for Three Players," "Ecarté," "Piquet and Cribbage," "Round Games."



"SWABBERS."

LONDON
CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED
1834

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

NOTE.—Clubs are trumps throughout.

Advanced Whist.

Introduction.

THE basic principles and methods of sound and good Whist having been explained in a former volume entitled, "The Hands at Whist," it will be here assumed that the reader can refer to it, or is thoroughly acquainted with the methods adopted.

Most sound Whist is, however, limited to routine playing; or, as the sailors say, "plain sailing," for the reason that

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judicious deviation from it is comparatively infrequent, and that doubts in minor points are of subsidiary importance. In more advanced Whist these deviations and minor points are treated with the same amount of care as the main game. Though every possible case cannot be brought under rule, a large number can be freed from causes of embarrassment.

For convenience, these additional matters requiring peculiar treatment may be collected under the following general heads:

Special play, under special conditions.

Alternative play, under doubt.

Coups, or deceptive devices involving sacrifice.

Defective maxims.

I.—Special Play.

UNDER this head may be treated :—

1. Forcing out any excess of your opponent's strength; and forcing generally.
2. Checking your opponents in a steady run of tricks.
3. Play in a deferred third suit.
4. Playing out a long weak suit.
5. Exceptional cases requiring peculiar treatment.

1. *Forcing out Hostile Strength.*—The general principle of play applying to ordinary conditions is that you lead through hostile strength up to hostile weakness, and up to your partner's

strength, his tenace and his power; but this assumes that the power held by the two parties is tolerably well matched on the whole, or is favourable to your side.

But should you adhere strictly to this method when the preponderance of power is greatly against you, the effect would be that your excessive care might thus obtain two or three tricks in the face of much difficulty, after which all the remaining tricks are simply indisputable; such treatment, though economic in detail, *may not be* economic on the whole. There would be far greater chance of making more tricks when the difficulties are less—that is, after the opponents' highest cards are out; hence it may be

better to defer your attempts at making tricks. Not that your opponents should be allowed to handle their power unchecked, for in that case they might make tricks with very low cards; but that their very high cards should be judiciously forced out by leading and playing up to them before striving to make tricks for yourself.

The most common and familiar case of such forcing near the beginning of a game is leading up to a turned-up honour, more especially to the ace or the king of trumps. The results of such a proceeding are that the turned-up honour wins a trick immediately, that its command over your partner's remaining high trumps is removed,

and that the lead is lost to you, but thrown into the hand of the fourth player. Forcing out hostile high cards in other suits is analogous; it renders your subsequent play more easy; it may enable some intermediate cards held by your own party to make; and these would be economic on the whole. For instance, if you force out three aces, your party may make with three tens; while otherwise neither the tens nor the knaves, &c., used in playing up to force would have made; the loss of the three leads is not so important as may appear at first thought, for these occur earlier in the game, when the cards are less known, instead of later, when they are known with certainty.



Example in Forcing.—Leading a losing card to draw a lead from your right opponent. (*See* diagram page 2.)

Hands:

A.	B.
Ace, kn., 10, 8, 6 Sp.	7, 3 . . . . Sp.
King . . . . Hts.	8, 7, 6, 5, 3, 2 . Hts.
8, 6, 3 . . . . Di.	9, 7, 4, 2 . . . Di.
Q, kn. 9, 8, . . Clbs.	Ace . . . . Clbs.

C.	D.
King, 4 . . . Sp.	Q, 9, 5, 2 . . Sp.
Ace, Q, kn., 4 . Hts.	10, 9 . . . . Hts.
Ace, Q . . . Di.	King, kn., 10, 5 . Di.
Kg., 10, 7, 5, 2 . Clbs.	6, 4, 3 . . . Clbs.

The trump card is the ace of clubs, and C leads.

C originally leads the four of hearts, you (A) win the trick; two rounds of spades follow, won by your side, leaving you the lead. You lead your losing spade up to the queen, which is inferentially with D.

4th Trick.

A B discards. C discards. D

D will not lead a trump for fear of aiding your game in establishment; he will not lead a losing spade; he must either lead a heart up to your partner in his original suit, or lead a diamond in his own strong suit.

5th Trick.



The result is, the command over your remaining spades is removed; your partner, C, gets the benefit of his major tenace in diamonds; he can lead out his hearts or trump out, and you can eventually establish your own powerful suit.

The next most common case of forcing is later on in a game; it consists in leading up to an opponent's winning trump, or to his winning card in some nearly played-out suit. This involves leading your losing trump, or your losing card in the

common suit, and counting on the winner's next lead. It may be a means necessary to establishing the powerful suit of your own side.

Similarly also you may force your partner.

Example in Forcing.—Leading a losing trump to force your partner, and give him the lead.

Hands:

A	B
King, 5 . . . Sp.	9, 4, 2 . . . . Sp.
Kn., 10, 9, 7 . . Hts.	Q, 8, 6, 4, 3, 2 . Hts.
Kn. . . . . Di.	9, 8, 2 . . . . Di.
Kn., 8, 7, 6, 3, 2 . Clbs.	Ace . . . . Clbs.

C	D
8, 7 . . . . . Sp.	Ace, Q, kn., 10, 6, 3 Sp.
Ace, 5 . . . . Hts.	King . . . . Hts.
Ace, Kg., 7, 6, 5 . Di.	Q, 10, 4, 3 . . Di.
Kg, 9, 5, 4 . . Clbs.	Q, 10 . . . . Clbs.

The nine of clubs is trump card and D leads.

After two rounds of spades you (A) lead trumps

and are stopped by B; your partner (C) regains the lead, and plays trumps, to which B renounces; then C gives three rounds of diamonds, you (A) trump his third round, and next.

9th Trick.

A B  C  D

10th Trick.

C  D A  B 

You (A) now lead your losing trump to force your partner.

11th Trick.

A  B  C  D 

12th Trick.

C  D  A  B 

13th Trick.

C  D A B

Had you led your winning trump in the eleventh trick, B would have won the twelfth trick with his Queen.

Some discrimination in forcing is certainly necessary, having view to the suit that will probably be led afterwards.

When this probability of a particular suit amounts nearly to a certainty, forcing may then be employed, not so much for removal of the card forced, as for forcing a particular lead from your right opponent, and thus throwing the game into your partner's hand. Such forcing for the

management or control of the game is necessarily different from forcing pure and simple. Under some circumstances a discard may be forced from an opponent that will tell in favour of your own side.

It may be said that "if forcing can have such advantages, why not make it the rule instead of the exception?" The answer is that forcing pushed to the extreme means perpetually and steadily helping your opponent to win, and that it is only within certain limits and under certain conditions, as above explained, that forcing constitutes a judicious removal of command. Sometimes it involves frequent changes of suit. Sometimes it requires repetition of forcing, as when an opponent refuses to be forced.

If several forcings are necessary, so also there is need of discrimination whether you or your partner can best undertake them severally in their respective suits, and when the resulting forced leads would probably be advantageous to you, to him, or to neither of you.

2. *Checking a Hostile Run of Tricks.*— It sometimes happens that your opponents, without holding absolutely crushing power, may hold just enough of it to secure a long steady run of tricks. Their strength consisting more in the position of their tenaces than merely in high cards, the result is that the high cards of your side are overridden, your strength is frittered away, while they make eight or nine tricks very smoothly.

The probability of such a case will be partly indicated by your own cards at the onset; your weakness of position is known, that of your partner afterwards shows itself.

The remedy is to depart from routine play in two respects, or in only one of the two, according to urgency; 1st. As your side invariably fails as fourth hand, second in hand must play high to stop the run. 2nd. As the weaker trump hand of your side cannot trump, the stronger trump hand must trump to check the run. Under other conditions, such play would be ruinous, both to your common suits and your strong trump hand; under these, it may avert ruin by just preventing your opponents from scoring game.

3. *Play in a Deferred Third Suit.*—When the third common suit is opened early in the game, the play in it is similar to that in corresponding first and second common suits. *See* "Easy Whist," Section IX. page 33. When the third common suit is *deferred*, or opened in the latter half of the game, it may, and generally does, require special treatment.

The suit is then necessarily a special one, because at its opening there is much inferential knowledge about its distribution, length, and partly also of strength in some of the hands. Certain players have markedly avoided opening the suit; the number of cards they hold is known, some

of these cards are known both as to suit and approximate value, and the inferential remainders, as well as one's own hand, help one to know what they can hold in the Deferred Third Suit. There are, then, two general alternative presumptions, first, that it is a powerful suit in some one hand, and the play must then be in accordance; second, that there is not any marked excess of power in it anywhere; the play in it is then as in a neutral suit. But it is better to conform one's play more closely to the exact conditions affecting the case. These are—

1st. Whether commanding trumps are still held by you or against you, or no trumps remain.

2nd. Whether commanding cards in

the first and second suits are still held by you, or against you, or are divided, or do not remain.

As it is not practicable to fit all cases exactly to fixed conditions, we will take three typical extreme cases, and leave the player to fit any possible case to some one of them by approximation.

First. When commanding trumps and retained cards in the first and second suits are against you, you then treat the Deferred Third Suit as a weak suit, leading highest, making early, and playing for the first two tricks in it, independently of all considerations of length and strength.

Second. When commanding trumps and retained cards in the first and second suits are on your side, or generally favourable to you, you may then treat the Deferred Third Suit either as a powerful or as a neutral suit, both in leading and in playing. *Finesse* on your side will be safe, though possibly not worth while.

The distinction between these two cases lies in the balance of backing power being *markedly* on their side, or on yours ; hence, in a doubtful intermediate case, perhaps the treatment of the suit as neutral is generally best.

Third. When trumps have been entirely

played out:—the treatment of the Deferred Third Suit is perfectly arbitrary; you lead and play it as powerful, as neutral, or as weak, independently of all consideration of length and strength. Your partner will hence attach no meaning to your lead in this case, and if your opponents are unwary enough to do so, they may suffer.

4. *Playing out a Long Weak Suit.*—The main features of an ordinary routine game are that you lead from and make tricks in the powerful suit of your own side, you snatch an occasional trick in hostile suits in which your side is weak, your trumps are used in a trump struggle,

and the extra trumps then employed at discretion against hostile winning cards of common suits.

Yet there may be certain conditions under which the scheme of the game should be different in order to achieve success. These conditions are, that the suits are very unequally distributed among the players, that the long suits of yourself or of your side are not powerful, but deficient in strength, and that, by presumption, your opponents' long suits are powerful, or combine length and strength.

We have already shown in Section X., of "The Hands at Whist," that a long suit that cannot make tricks is a suit ruinous to a hand ; hence, under the conditions

before mentioned, one would start the game with evident impending ruin; to avert this, special play is needful.

In this case the original lead of the game is an advantage; without it, a trick should be snatched as early as possible by the second player, to obtain the lead. Having the lead, your best original lead would be a winning card, if you have one, in your long suit, or at least your highest. Should it win, you follow immediately by leading your single card or two-card suit. Your partner will, from this leading, and from his own hand together, understand the special case, which is, that you merely hold length (for, had you power, you would after your winning

card have led a trump). He will return the lead in your short suit at once, for probably he could not, even if he wished, return your very long suit. The remainder of the game consists either in keeping up a Sustained Single Ruff in one suit and making in another suit, or in a Sustained Double Ruff, until at least the odd trick or more is won.

To prevent waste of strength, the suits are led out highest first, and successively downwards.

Such special play may appear childish, but under the conditions it may be the sole mode of extrication. There is, however, a doubt attending it which renders it risky. Your knowledge of the suits at the

beginning is imperfect, and there is therefore a chance that you may be spoiling the establishment of a powerful suit in your partner's hand, through destroying the trump-power of your own side.

5. *Exceptional Cases.*—There are cases more isolated, and under narrower conditions, where special play of some sort would be advantageous. Proceeding onwards to absolutely isolated cases, special rules of play would be required for them; and this, if practicable, would be the only way of dealing with them correctly.

But even in Law and in Medicine we find laws and treatments to be suited merely to 70 or 80 per cent. of cases,

while in the remaining 30 to 20 per cent. they are not only inapplicable, but productive of harm. So also with Whist rules, should they be applied beyond the limits for which they are designed, they are mischievous.

Rigid maxims must fail somewhere or under some conditions.

Exceptional cases require exceptional treatment; they should not be *forced* under any general law, nor should they be driven into nutshells by clipping peculiarities.

II.—Alternative Play.

The basic principles of routine play having been explained in "The Hands at Whist," and those of special play in the last Section of this book, the whole is complete, provided that no coup or deceptive device involving present waste is attempted by either side. Such coups will be considered separately.

Before proceeding to them, let us briefly notice how far alternative modes of play under doubt, or dilemmas, become possible, *without departing from basic principles*, and on what they depend.

At some epoch in the game—that is, at

some trick, the doubt occurs, "Which card shall I play?" To any one moderately good at Whist, the doubt can only be due to one or both of the following causes:—

1. Your own change of intention or design in treating the game.
2. Your want of knowledge of the location of certain unplayed cards.
3. The absence of absolutely high, low, or intermediate cards in any hand by suit, and the unintentional deception produced by the play of relatively high, low, or intermediate cards, instead of them, in the first and second suits.

1. Regarding the first of these three

causes, a homily on the subject of indecision might be appropriate; but the distinct governing rule is that "the original aim of the game should be adhered to until its execution appears hopeless." Then, and not till then, should the general treatment alter.

If the original intention be to establish a long suit of your own, it may be converted into establishing your partner's long suit without very much alteration in play. But if establishment for your side becomes hopeless in prospect, it certainly is most unwise to continue the attempt for a single trick beyond. Destructive play, coups, and special devices, have their opportunities, which do not recur in the

game; hence, the earlier the change the more effective their result in the contest, and the greater the probability that your side may just arrive at gaining the odd trick, in face of difficulties.

Your own insight into the location of the cards, the capabilities of the players, and the form in which support from your partner may be expected, is your only basis for the decision about hopelessness. This insight is a grand power at Whist, as in other things, which is born with some persons, and more or less developed in them by effort and habit; it cannot be supplied. The sole advice possible is, "Whatever your decision, act promptly."

2 and 3. The two other causes may be

classed together, as they each amount to a want of knowledge of the position of certain cards. Strength may be held back somewhere, a coup may have been practised on you, or, as occurs sometimes in the more specially puzzling cases, someone may have made a mistake in play. These last cases cannot be dealt with in any decisive manner, for the reason that all Whist calculations and inferences are based on rational procedure.

In the former cases the doubt resolves itself, or may be made to resolve itself, into the simple form, "Where is a particular card?" If you presume entire ignorance of its location, and you mistrust all inferences about it, the safer prelimi-

nary assumption is that it is in the hand of one of your two opponents. Sometimes, however, it is clearly inferred that they hold that card; so in either case the question arises, "Which of them?" It is on this point that your alternative play will depend, as leading or playing through strength, or up to strength.

In such cases it is seldom wise to assume that a coup, has been played against you as a deceptive device, and to act entirely on that assumption. But, suspecting any such device, it is better to leave the whole open to doubt, and trust to calculated chances for your information; for it *very often* happens that your play, dependent on such calcu-

lated or average location, may at the same time help to destroy the object of the presumed device. By adopting this principle, you may often prevent your doubts from removing you needlessly far from sureness.

Also, it *sometimes* happens that the economy of your play is only slightly affected, under the two alternative assumptions of position of the unknown card.

When you fall back on the calculated chances of location of any particular card, it must be remembered that you *risk* a chance, and cannot expect to be right exceedingly often.

The calculable chances of location of

cards at Whist are comparatively simple; they were more used in former times than now, because they were practically more required under old methods of play. Little that is useful could be added to them, as expressed in any old book about Whist; they are here given for use in the few cases where they are wanted. The chances for and against any particular player holding any particular card out of a certain number are those most useful, when reduced down to the special case by successive remainders. It is, of course, necessary also to apply or reduce the chances for the particular person or persons that may possibly hold that card.

Table of Chances.

I. As to any named card or cards, affecting your lead :—

	Chance.
1. Against your partner holding a certain card	2 to 1
2. In favour of his holding 1 card out of any 2	5 ,, 4
,, ,, 1 ,, ,, 3	5 ,, 2
,, ,, 1 ,, ,, 4	4 ,, 1
3. Against his holding 2 cards out of any 3	3 ,, 1
,, ,, 2 ,, ,, 4	3 ,, 2

II. As to a winning card or cards :—

1. In favour of your partner holding 1 winning card	5 to 1
,, ,, ,, 2 ,,	4 ,, 1
,, ,, ,, 3 ,,	3 ,, 1
,, ,, ,, 4 ,,	$1\frac{1}{2}$,, 1
,, ,, ,, 5 ,,	$\frac{2}{3}$,, 1

III. As to holding trumps in a full hand :

	As dealer.	Not dealer.
1. Against anyone holding 6 trumps	15 to 1	30 to 1
,, ,, ,, 5 ,,	8 ,, 1	15 ,, 1
,, ,, ,, 4 ,,	$1\frac{1}{2}$,, 1	5 ,, 1
,, ,, ,, 3 ,,	1 ,, $2\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$,, 1
,, ,, ,, 2 or more	1 ,, $5\frac{1}{2}$	1 ,, $2\frac{1}{2}$
,, ,, ,, 1 ,,	1 ,, 30	1 ,, 50

IV. As to holding honours in a full hand:—

	Dealer's Side.	Not Dealer's
Against a side holding 2 honours	$1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1	$1\frac{2}{3}$ to 1
,, anyone ,, 3 ,,	4 ,, 1	
,, a side ,, 4 ,,	6 ,, 1	18 ,, 1

The chances about holding trumps in large numbers are useless.

III.—Whist Coups.

A Whist-coup is a deceptive device, involving departure from either routine play or special play; it is non-economic in the present, sacrificing something in some way for the sake of future benefit. There are only four general forms in which a Whist-coup can occur:—

1. Throwing away a high card needlessly, or wasting a trump.
2. Underplay of various sorts, or neglecting to win a trick.
3. Holding back strength in preference to instant use of it.
4. A deceptive suit-opening or lead.

It will now be shown that true coups are of forms 1 or 2; those of forms

3 and 4 can seldom be coups in a strict sense. Before entering into special forms of coup the general forms will be analyzed.

1. *Throwing away useful cards.*—This is evidently opposed to ordinary routine play, not economic in itself, and is deceptive, as the intention is to induce the opponents to believe that the player has not a lower card of that suit, perhaps, even, that he has not another. The ulterior object may be to scare the opponents from that suit, to induce them to lead some particular suit, or more specially to lead trumps out. All the elements of a coup are present.

2. *Underplay.*—Underplay exists when a player positively and unmistakably can

win the current trick by a card he holds, but does not, preferring to play a lower card of the same suit. The result being the loss of the current trick; the sacrifice or want of present economy is evident. It is a departure from routine. It is a deception, as its object is to induce the opponents to believe that the player could not have taken the trick, and hence does not hold any card that could have taken it. The ulterior object is to employ the reserved card to greater general advantage by winning with it subsequently; there may also be other ulterior objects. All the elements of a coup are present.

3. *Retaining strength in preference to immediate use of it.*—In this case there

is some doubt whether the retained card would have won the trick if played; for instance, as second or third in hand, when a higher card might be held by a later player or not. The economy is a matter of present doubt; the play in either alternative is admissible under routine. Any such holding back *may* be partially deceptive, and has an ulterior object; but these two conditions are not alone sufficient to constitute a coup in the strict sense.

4. *A deceptive suit-opening or lead.*—This involves a departure from routine play, and hence also from its economy; it may be deceptive in effect, and have some ulterior object. But in order to be strictly a coup, it should also be a departure from the

Special Play suited to the conditions. In routine play, the lead in trumps is arbitrary. *See* "Easy Whist," p. 37. An arbitrary lead in a Deferred third suit is in accordance with the principles of Special, Play (*See* Section I. of this book). Hence any strict coup, by way of suit-opening, must either occur in the First or Second common suit, or Early Third suit. But it could very rarely be advantageous in result to attempt such a thing, for it would probably deceive your partner at an early period of the game. Some persons may even say that such a coup is impossible among good players. It may, therefore, be treated as comparatively useless.

A true coup must, therefore, consist

either in sacrificing *a useful card*, or in sacrificing *a trick*, in any suit.

i. *Sacrificing a useful Card* :—

The Scare.—The commonest sacrifice of a high card has for its object to draw a trump-lead from the opponents, and more specially from the winner of the trick. The same coup may also be used to draw a lead from him in any other probable suit, or merely to scare the opponents from the current suit, with indifference as to the next lead.

The circumstances under which any such coup is likely to be effective must be considered.

The scare, or high card, must evidently be thrown in the powerful or successful

suit of the opponents, which would otherwise be continued by them; in order to attract sufficient notice, it is most often rejected by the second player; the result is to draw the required lead from the fourth player, and to benefit the *partner* of the placer of the scare. An example of this will be given afterwards.

Should the scare not take effect in the way required, and the need of a trump-lead from *anyone* be urgent, a low card is afterwards thrown in the same suit in the next round, thus completing a Blue Peter, or signal to your partner to lead trumps out.

The scare is the basis of the simpler series of whist-coups, designed to place a lead.

It pre-supposes that you would trump the scared suit in the next round. This would not necessarily be disadvantageous to your opponents under all circumstances; for if you had a strong trump-hand, it might be spoiled by the forcing you induce; and it might be better for your opponents to do this, even though they lose a trick in their own powerful suit. Hence, it also pre-supposes that you hold a weak trump-hand. If this is in accordance with fact, the scare may be effective. If it is not, and your opponents have had sufficient presumptive evidence that you hold a strong hand in trumps, your scare may not serve; they see through your coup,

and you waste a high card to no purpose.

Granting, however, that the opponents would be scared, the other consideration is, what choice of suits has the winning opponent for his next lead?

If your own or your partner's powerful or strong suit is one that he may lead, will you or he respectively be fourth player in it? If not, and the strength of your own side is led through, the intention of your coup may be set at nought.

Hence the conditions for rendering the coup effective are that the scare is thrown from the hand that is weak in trumps, and that the lead placed shall be favourable to either you or your partner as fourth player.

The scare into trumps is so simple and common a case as hardly to require illustration. The scare into a favourable suit is very similar.

Example of Sacrificing a High Card.— Drawing a lead in trumps by a scare.

Hands:

A.		B.	
Ace, 10 . . .	Sp.	Kg, 2	Sp.
Kg., 9, 6, 3 . .	Hts.	Qn., Kn., 10, 8, 7	Hts.
Kg., Kn., 8, 7, 6, 5, 2	Di.	Ace, 8 . . .	Di.
None . .	Clbs.	Kg., Kn., 3, 2 .	Clbs.

C.		D.	
Qn., Kn., 9, 8, 7	Sp.	6, 5, 4, 3 . . .	Sp.
5, 2	Hts.	Ace, 4 . . .	Hts.
3	Di.	Qn., 9, 4 . . .	Di.
Ace, Qn., 9, 8, 7	Clbs.	10, 6, 5, 4 . .	Clbs.

The trump card is the two of clubs, and C leads a spade. Your partner, trying his long suit, is checked in its second round.

First Trick.

C  D  A B 

Second Trick.

A  B C  D 

B now leads his most powerful suit.

Third Trick.

B  C  D  A

You (A) throw away your King; it acts as a scare, and induces D to lead trumps up to your partner.

Fourth Trick.

D  A Renounce B C 

C, your partner, sees he can draw two trumps

to one, continues trumps for two more rounds, and eventually establishes. The coup tells most effectually for your side.

Besides sacrificing a high common card, there is a special case in which a trump may be sacrificed to good effect, by under-trumping your partner's trick; it presumes that it would be disadvantageous to your side for you to obtain the next lead.

Example in Sacrificing a Trump Card.—Under-trumping your partner's trick; leaving him the lead.

This coup has been so thoroughly investigated in its various forms by Cavendish, under the term Grand Coup, that little more can be added; as the typical example of it that he gives fully explains it, it is here quoted from page 131 of his book.

The coup occurring generally in the last few rounds of the game, the hands at the end of the 9th trick, won by B, are

A.	B.
Kn. . . . . Hts.	9, 6 . . . . . Sp.
Kn. 9, 5 . . . Clubs	10, 9 . . . . . Di.
C.	**D.**
Qn. . . . . Sp.	5, 3 . . . . . Di.
5, 3 . . . . . Hts.	10, 7 . . . . . Clbs.
6 . . . . . Clbs.	

Clubs are trumps, and B leads in the 10th trick.

Tenth Trick.

B  C  D  A 

Here you (A) under-trump your partner, leaving him the lead.

Eleventh Trick.

C D  A B 

Twelfth Trick.

A  B  C  D 

Thirteenth Trick.

A B  C  D 

But, if in the 10th trick, you (A) play the knave of hearts and reserve your three trumps, D may refuse to trump the queen of spades, which would be led by your partner; they would then necessarily win either the 12th or the 13th trick.

A clearer typical example cannot be given.

ii. *Sacrificing a Trick, or under-play.*

The commonest sort of under-play is purposely losing the second trick in a common suit, so that your reserved commanding card may take the third trick in the same suit, and establish the remainder of it. The same method, also, may apply in losing the third trick of a long suit, so as to stand with two extra winning cards, after your winning trump has cleared your opponent's last trump. Either of these two cases might also occur in trumps.

Example of Sacrificing a Trick in a Common Suit.—Under-play in the second round of a suit, so as to make in the third.

This is more usually attempted, when the opponents are strong in trumps.

Hands:

A	B
Ace, Qn., Kn., 10, 3 Sp.	7 . . . . Sp.
Ace, 10, 2 . . . Hts.	King, Kn., 3 Hts
King, Qn., 10 . . Di.	Ace, 7, 3, 2 Di.
8, 7 . . . . . Clbs.	Ace, 6, 5, 4, 3 Clbs.

C	D
King, 8, 6, 5 . . Sp.	9, 4, 2 . . Sp.
9, 6 . . . . . Hts.	Qn., 8, 7, 5, 4 Hts.
Kn., 9, 6, 4. . . Di.	8, 5, . . Di.
Kn., 10, 9 . . . Clbs.	King, Qn, 2 Clbs.

The five of clubs is the trump card, and you partner, C, leads.

First Trick.

C  D  A  B 

Second Trick.

A B  C  D 

Third Trick.

B  C  D A 

Fourth Trick.

D A  B  C 

Fifth Trick.

D  A  B C 

Sixth Trick.

B C  D  A 

You (A) here lose this 6th trick by under-play.

On B continuing hearts, you make in its third round with your ace, and lead spades again. Your spades are trumped ; the ace of trumps is led, you may afterwards gain a trick in diamonds, and your two remaining spades are established.

This case merely serves for illustration, but such conditions do not ensure success.

Another special case of under-play exists in neglecting to over-trump *at the finish*, and reserving your trump for other use. (Such a refusal *earlier* in the out-play might be merely routine play.)

Example of Sacrificing a Trick.—Neglecting to over-trump at the *finish.*

The typical case, in which over-trumping near

the finish would be positively disadvantageous has been laid down by Cavendish in the following Example, which is quoted from p. 125 of his book.

The remainders of the hands after the 10th trick are

A		B	
Ace . . .	Di.	8, 7 . . .	Hts.
King 6 . .	Clbs.	3	Clbs.
C		**D**	
9, 4 . . .	Di.	Kn. . . .	Sp.
10 . . .	Hts.	9, 8 . . .	Clbs.

Clubs are trumps, and B has the lead in the 11th trick.

Eleventh Trick.

B  C  D  A 

In this trick you (A) refuse to over-trump D, and lose the trick.

Twelfth Trick.

D A  B  C 

Thirteenth Trick.

A B  C  D 

Notice that if you (A) take the 11th trick by over-trumping, you will lose both the 12th and 13th.

In this case you hold the best and fourth best trumps out of five of them, and your right opponent holds the second best and third best. But if B did not hold a trump, so that there were only four trumps in all, the position would be the same, so, also, the loss from over-trumping.

Remarks on Whist-coups.—It has latterly been a very prevalent custom to attempt coups whenever possible, and to attach too much importance to them; some of them have undergone *renaming*, so that they may be more easily distinguished in conversation.

For the convenience of readers that have adopted that nomenclature, its parallels in simple terms are here given.

Deschapelles' Coup.	This is not a Coup. It means leading in a Deferred Third Suit with a high card, when you hold length in it. See Section I. on Special Play, p. 17.
Grand Coup.	This is a Coup. It means undertrumping your partner's trick, when the lead would be positively disadvantageous in your hands.
Vienna Coups of two sorts.	One is not a coup, the other generally is. Forcing a discard from your opponent is not necessarily a coup, but may be merely Special play. See p. 14. The other Vienna Coup is not yet sufficiently well defined for distinctive and exact definition.

In conclusion, it may be noticed that there is no worse play at Whist than attempting to obtain through a real coup any object that might be equally well attained through direct play without either sacrifice or risk. As in ordinary matters, an over-cunning person is most especially a fool.

IV.—Defective Maxims.

Defective Maxims.—Though the writer of these three little books on Whist is undesirous of throwing the mistakes of others at them personally, or of opposing their general treatment of Whist by objecting to minor detail, it is permissible to correct some larger errors of principle, too often accepted as indisputable. A few of them will be mentioned. The replies

involve ordinary and frequent cases, that are not exceptional.

1. *D. M.*—When your partner leads a thirteenth card, and no trumps have been played, it is certain he holds good trumps, or he would not risk such a lead.

Reply.—No; his lead may be excellent, though his trumps may be weak. He may force a trump from the fourth player, and thus strengthen your hand. The opponent, weak in trumps, should trump your partner's thirteenth card; if that opponent is second player, you may then force a high trump from the fourth player.

2. *D. M.*—If weak in all suits but trumps, not to lead trumps is to show your own weakness.

Reply.—No; your weakness will doubtless become evident a little later. But leading out trumps without an ulterior

object might perhaps be playing your opponents' game for them.

3 *D. M.*—An honour being the turn-up card, either on the right or left, it should not influence you in leading, or in refraining from leading, trumps.

Reply.—The knowledge of that honour affects the play on your side. It may be your duty to prevent the one on your right from being an incubus on your partner. Also, holding a weak hand, it may be one of the few things you can do to help your partner to *finesse* by leading through the one on the left.

4. *D. M.*—If you discard from your weak hand, whilst having no trump, your adversaries know your weak point, whereas, discarding from your strong (meaning long?) suit, you may throw them off their guard, and obtain a lead.

Reply.—It is not sound, ordinary play thus to discard from a long suit. It is admissible only as a coup; and as such would be clever under suitable conditions; under others, you would deceive your partner and make matters bad.

5. *D. M.*—In trumps never pass a trick as third player.

Reply.—The success of your side may depend on your reserving or holding back a high trump for use in a later round, especially the ace.

6. *D. M.*—As third player, you must never head your partner when the second player has played below the lead, unless you are compelled by the condition of your hand.

Reply.—Not so. You should play in accordance with the probable fall of cards all round in that suit.

7. *D. M.*—Always try to force a high trump from the opponents' side, or it may be used to bring in a suit.

Reply.—In some cases you would by so doing help them to bring in a suit. In others you might by waiting for a trump lead from another quarter allow the hostile high trump to fall to a higher one, or comparatively ineffectively. Forcing is good only when precisely suitable.

8 *D. M.*—In playing for the odd trick, never trump out if you can avoid it, for you can hardly be sure of the other three hands.

Reply.—As the need of the odd trick is urgent, and you are indifferent as to the opponents establishing a suit, after you have won the odd trick, trumping out may be specially well suited to your purposes, as it may enable you to make the odd trick before they can establish.

9 *D. M.*—At the finish, holding long trumps, if you hold three, it is best to lead the smallest; by this means you give your partner a chance of making tricks, and still hold a commanding card in your own hand.

Reply.—No. The knowledge of the cards should determine your lead, apart from any such general rule. The intermediate card of your three would generally be safer and better. In some cases you should lead the best to clear a high hostile trump.

10 *D. M.*—Do not over-trump your right hand opponent without you see absolute necessity.

Reply.—The converse is more correct generally—namely, always over-trump your right hand opponent, unless you have sufficient reason for doing otherwise.

11 *D. M.*—Avoid ruffing your right hand adversary's lead, if you can without danger.

Reply.—When you are weak in trumps, ruffing his lead may be the best thing you can do to turn the game, especially if you know well what to lead next, and how to continue.

12. *D. M.*—The first object is to win the game, the second to save it.

Reply.—Not always. When your side cannot win, it is foolish to attempt it as a first consideration. Destructive play from the beginning may prevent your opponents from gaining more than the odd trick, and thus defer the score of game to the next deal.

More such maxims might be quoted and answered, but the above are, perhaps, sufficient to put the Whist student on his

guard, and to moderate some of the numerous cases in which the blind lead the blind.

In conclusion, remember that defective maxims, like hoop-iron razors, are made for sale rather than for employment. Reflect how few sensible men would buy a horse or a machine without knowing sufficient about such things, in preference to asking a competent friend to buy or advise for them. Similarly, also, with regard to Whist maxims; the test is, "Will they work well?" It is hoped that the Whist system here adopted, which avoids the errors of older methods, will be made to do so.

THE END.

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